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Abstract
In a Cournot duopoly, if only one rm hires a manager while the
other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium
emerges, with the managerial rm as the leader. This happens under
at least three di¤erent delegation schemes. We illustrate the di¤erent
meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of
best replies at the market stage.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal research by Baumol (1958) and Schelling (1960), the litera-
ture on strategic delegation has been growing signicantly and various types
of managerial incentives have been put forward. We may roughly group such
incentives into three types, depanding on whether, in addition to its own
prots, a rms objective function includes also output (or revenue), market
share or the rivals prots.
Detecting which actual managerial incentives are subministered by own-
ers in modern corporations is an important empirical question.1 Not less
important, however, is the understanding of which type of delegation con-
tract would be selected from a menu of di¤erent types. Jansen et al. (2009)
investigate the strategic choice of managerial incentives in a Cournot industry
within the aforementioned threefold menu, and show that, at the subgame
perfect equilibrium, owners hire managers through contracts based on com-
parative performance, the latter being Pareto-e¢ cient for rms as compared
to the two alternatives. Moreover, it turns out that when a rm delegates
while the other does not, the resulting equilibrium outcome at the market
stage replicates the Cournot-Stackelberg one, with the managerial rm lead-
ing irrespective of the specic nature of the incentive scheme.
In this note, we show that this result, common across the three delegation
schemes, is generated by three completely di¤erent mechanisms a¤ecting the
best reply function of the managerial rm.
2 The three market subgames
The model describes a homogeneous good duopoly with inverse demand func-
tion p = a   Q; where Q = q1 + q2 is aggregate output, qi is the individual
quantity of rm i and a is a positive parameter. Both rms use the same
1See, for instance, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
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technology described by the cost function Ci = cqi; with c 2 (0; a). For the
sake of simplicity, we pose a  c = A. Firms are quantity-setting agents and
move simultaneously at the market stage.
The baseline models tackling the separation between ownership and con-
trol for strategic reasons share a three-stage structure, where information is
complete, symmetric and imperfect in every stage, while being perfect be-
tween any two adjacent stages. At the rst stage, owners decide whether to
delegate or not; at the second, if they do, they tune the incentives subminis-
tered to their own managers; at the third stage, managers or owners play a
Cournot game. In every stage, players behave noncooperatively. Contracts
are fully observable.
In general, the incentive given to a rms manager consists in a combi-
nation of her/his rms prots and something else. So far, three alternatives
have been accounted for:
 output level (as in Vickers, 1985) or revenues (Fershtman, 1985; Fersht-
man and Judd, 1987; and Sklivas, 1987), which are indeed equivalent
(Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002). We will refer to this scheme as
V FJS;
 market share (Jansen et al. 2007; and Ritz, 2008), JR henceforth;
 comparative performance, whereby the manager has to maximise a
weighted average of her/his rms prots and the rivals (Salas Fu-
mas, 1992; Lundgren, 1996; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; and Miller
and Pazgal, 2001), MP in the remainder.
We now examine the three specic objective functions of managers and
the bearings of each type of incentive on Cournot competition in the market
stage.
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2.1 Delegation based on output level
In V FJS, the manager of rm i chooses output to maximise Mi = i+ iqi;
where i is the weight attached to output, to be specied in the delegation
contract at the second stage by rm is owner. The e¤ect of this incentive on
rm is behaviour in the market stage is captured by a parallel shift of the
same rms linear reaction function in the output space (see Figure 1). The
optimal unilateral shift reproduces the Cournot-Stackelberg outcome with
the managerial rm as the leader.
Figure 1 Unilateral delegation as in V FJS
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In Figure 1, the thin best replies are those characterising the Cournot
game among entrepreneurial rms. The isoprot curves at their intersection
are also drawn. The thick line is rm is reaction function when a manager
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controls its output. The outward parallel shift is indicated by horizontal
arrows. The interception between the managerial reaction function and the
entrepreneurial one (point S) identies the Stackelberg equilibrium in the
output space.
2.2 Delegation based on market share
If an incentive based on market share is adopted, as in JR, the managers
maximand becomes Mi = i + iqi= (qi + qj). The resulting rst order con-
dition (FOC) is
@Mi
@qi
= A  2qi   qj + i
qi + qj

1  qi
qi + qj

= 0 (1)
which produces a best reply function qi (qj) concave in qj: If rm j hasnt
hired a manager (i.e., j = 0), its best reply is the standard linear Cournot
reaction function. Notice that, if qj = 0; (1) is satised by qi = A=2; which
is the Stackelberg leaders output. The nonlinear component in the r.h.s. of
(1) must be concave for all qj > 0 in order for rm is best reply to bend
back and intersect rm js best reply at qi = A=2.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the two reaction functions actually intersect
in correspondence of the Stackelberg equilibrium with the managerial rm
once again playing the leaders role, with i = 2
 
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p
2  1A2=49. Here, the
reaction function of the managerial rm is the thick concave curve departing
from the horizontal axis at the monopoly output level and intersecting the
entrepreneurial rms best reply in correspondence of the same output in
point S.
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Figure 2 Unilateral delegation as in JR
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2.3 Delegation based on comparative performance
In MP , the objective function of the manager of rm i is Mi = i + ij.
The FOC taken on qi yields a best reply function
qi (qj) =
A  (1 + i) qj
2
(2)
from which it is evident that delegation modies the slope. If the rival has no
manager, the optimal contract sets i =  1 in such a way that qi (qj) becomes
at at the Stackelberg leaders output, as depicted in Figure 3. This is the
consequence of the fact that here, while the delegation scheme is nonlinear,
it generates a best reply which is linear in qj; where delegation rotates the
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reaction function of the managerial rm. Hence, in order to reproduce the
Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium, the owner must provide the meneger with
a dominant strategy at the market subgame.
Figure 3 Unilateral delegation as in MP
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The foregoing discussion produces then the following
Proposition 1 As far as the market stage is concerned, if one rm dele-
gates control to a manager while the other doesnt, the choice of the incentive
scheme in the set fV FJS; JR;MPg is immaterial as the outcome systemati-
cally replicates the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium with the managerial rm
leading.
A straightforward implication of this result is that, if one observes the
market subgame equilibrium only, without knowing the nature of the man-
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agerial contract, one cannot infer the exact contents of the incentive given by
the owner to her/his manager. This is because, from the standpoint of market
allocation and performance, the three contracts are indeed observationally
equivalent. That is to say, if your rival is not smart enough to copycat your
strategy, then literally anything goes, at least within the threefold menu used
so far in this literature.
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